

#### Cyber-SHIP Lab

SECURING MARITIME

Presented

#### UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH

by

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#### On behalf of:

Professor Kevin Jones - Principal Investigator Dr Kimberly Tam - Academic lead Chloe Rowland - Project Manager

#### Wesley Andrews

#### Industrial Research Assistant (Electronics/Hardware)/Project Engineer Cyber-SHIP Lab



#### What is the Cyber-SHIP Lab?

- A Unique **£3.2 million hardware-based** platform
- Physical twin
- Real-world solutions to real-world problems
- Provide reports to OEMs

Software Hardware Information Protection



## Cyber-SHIP Lab current status – Aug 2022

- Fully functioning lab with a growing number of bridge and control system configurations
- In-house custom built scale physical test rigs for steering and propulsion systems
- Set of standard tests providing basic vulnerability assessment
- Custom crafted malware
- Commercial consultancy to provide standard vulnerability reports
- Still a work in progress, but progressing steadily...





## Two sides of the story...

#### The Console Room

#### Visualisation of data

Physical hardware visualisation of attacks Pen-testing Research Project development Development of custom electronics and software Teaching/training









Custom built, in-house physical model of rudder and propulsion system simulator



Bespoke electronics design work

Tiller Arm

Main PCB

pump

Hydraulic rams

Rudder

Robo Compass







## Now presenting...

#### Avanthika Vineetha Harish

#### Industrial Research Assistant (Pen-testing) -Cyber-SHIP Lab

## Testing

- Standard approach to device testing
- Testing at system level and entire configuration level
- Developing mariner-checked realistic scenarios
- Variety of attacks and vectors:
  - Denial of Service
  - Man in the Middle
  - Ransomware
  - Comms Channel
  - Supply Chain
  - NMEA 2000 injection (in house)









Custom NMEA 2000 Injection attack

**Rubber Ducky** 



## Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs)

- 'Black Box' for ships
- Running on old OSes and software
- Currently, VDRs do not have any mechanism to verify integrity and security of data stored.



## Tested attacks

- Reverse shells
- Ransomware attacks
- Insider attacks
- Hard drive erasure
- USB based attacks
- Specific exploits
- Manipulating navigation data



## Now presenting...

## Rory Hopcraft

#### Industrial Researcher (Cyber-security/Governance)-CyberMAR/Cyber-SHIP Lab

## The Plymouth "ecosystem"





Shipping operators (civil and defence), equipment manufacturers, regulators, insurers





#### **Research engagements and our partners**

- Contract research, consultancy and PhDs
- Partnering for research
- Partnering with armed forces
- Partnering with industry



## A sister project...





#### Cyber-MAR: a real-world attack scenario

*Cyber-MAR project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 833389* 







#### Setting the scene Introduction to Port of Valencia

- Handling over 6 million tonnes of cargo a year
- Important regional hub for transhipment
- Handles a wide variety of cargo:
  - liquid bulk
  - dry bulk
  - containerised cargo and
  - vehicular traffic



Port Of Valencia







#### Setting the scene Ship for the Scenario

Length	397 m (1,302 ft 6 in)	
Beam	56 m (183 ft 9 in)	
Draught	16.02 m (52 ft 7 in)	
Depth	30 m (98 ft 5 in) (deck edge to keel)	
Speed	25.5 knots (47.2 km/h; 29.3 mph)	
Capacity	•14,770+ <u>TEU</u>	









## Vessel navigation attack









#### Now presenting...



#### Juan Dorje Palbar Misas

# Research Assistant in Navigation and Maritime Cyber - CyberMAR/Cyber-SHIP Lab









































#### **POINT OF NO RETURN**













**Reference of tugboats salvage operation as per following case:** *"Mumbai Maersk, which ran aground outside Bremerhaven, Germany on 2 February, 2022"* 

#### Conclusion and consequences

- 1. Unavoidable collision with rock pier
- 2. Blockage of Port entrance 3-7 days
- 3. Depending on Salvage operations:
  - Possible damage to the ship and environment
  - Substrate removal operations
  - Available tugboats







#### Economic consequences





	Losses (EUR M)	Initial Port Disruption			
		3 days	5 days	7 days	
	France	950	1,600	2,200	
	Germany	1,000	1,700	2,400	
	Italy	600	1,000	1,400	
	Netherlands	550	900	1,300	
	Spain	2,500	4,200	5,900	
	UK	800	1,300	1,900	





## Demo time





## Cyber-SHIP Lab

SECURING MARITIME

## Thank you from the Cyber-SHIP Lab team!

For more information please contact:

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